This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns. It abstracts from risk premia and focuses exclusively on liquidity. A float-adjusted return model (FARM) is derived, explaining the pricing of liquidity with a simple linear formula: In equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its dollar freefloat. The dollar free-float is the portion of market capitalization available for sale. This suggests that dollar free-float is an appropriate measure of liquidity, consistent with the linear specifications commonly used in the empirical literature. The qualitative predictions of the model corroborates much of the empirical evidence. An analysis of the dynamic impact of news sheds light on time variation in liquidity.
Introduction
Why do different assets earn different expected returns? One fundamental reason is that they may bear different risks. Many empirical studies, however, suggest that risk characteristics cannot explain all variations in expected returns. After controlling for risk premia, expected returns appear to be positively related to bid-ask spreads, and negatively related to turnover, dollar trading volume, and market capitalization. These patterns suggest that returns are related to liquidity, broadly defined as the ease of buying and selling. Liquidity is reflected in small trading costs, measured for instance by the bid-ask spread, and associated with the opportunity to buy and sell large quantities in a short time, near the quoted price. These properties may be proxied by turnover or trading volume.
This paper provides a dynamic asset pricing model in which cross-sectional variation in asset returns is exclusively due to liquidity differences. The first objective is to explain the pricing of liquidity differences and to suggest an appropriate measure of liquidity. The second objective is to reproduce some of the qualitative relationships documented by the empirical literature. We follow a modelling strategy of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] . As in their model, trade is decentralized: Investors search for each other, meet in pairs, and bargain over prices. In this environment, liquidity is related to trading delays. An more liquid asset has shorter trading delays: a buyers and sellers of that asset are more likely to be found in a short time interval.
In the present model, as opposed to Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] , many different assets are traded. Investors allocate their fixed budgets of search efforts to the various assets. They recognize that the value of searching for a particular asset is related to the likelihood of finding a counterparty for that asset in a short time. The first-order condition of the associated search optimization problem is key to the model's implications, as it reflects how the likelihood of finding an asset is priced in equilibrium. Namely, in equilibrium, investors are indifferent between searching for alternative traded assets, under natural technical conditions. This indifference property gives rise to a distribution of "liquidity premia." An asset that is easier to find is sold at a higher price.
The first contribution of this paper is to derive a float-adjusted return model, or FARM, 1 explaining the pricing of liquidity differences with the following simple linear formula
In formula (1), R k is the return on asset k, one of the many assets traded in the steady-state equilibrium we study; R L is the return on some appropriately defined infinitely liquid asset. The dollar free-float φ k of asset k is defined as the portion of the market capitalization available for sale. We denote byφ the average dollar free-float in the market. Lastly, R M is a reference float-weighted market return. In words, the FARM (1) states that, in the steady-state, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its dollar free-float. The constant of proportionality is the liquidity spread of some reference float-weighted market return. Many empirical studies of liquidity spreads estimate linear models. They control for risk with some factor model, and measure an asset liquidity by its bid-ask spread, its trading volume, or its turnover. The FARM (1) suggests that, with such a linear specification, liquidity is best measured by the dollar free-float.
In traditional Walrasian asset-pricing models with liquidity effects such as those of Amihud and Mendelson [1986] , Constantinides [1986] , Heaton and Lucas [1996] , Vayanos [1998] , and Huang [2002] , assets can be bought and sold instantly, but differ by an exogenously given transaction cost. A more liquid asset is defined as one with a smaller transaction cost. In these models, cross-sectional variation in asset returns is explained by exogenously specified differences in transaction costs. A second contribution of this paper is to explain cross-sectional variation in asset returns without relying on an exogenously specified cross-sectional variation in transaction costs. Although, in the model proposed here, the search technology is the same for all assets, heterogeneous transaction costs arise endogenously, and take the form of heterogenous trading delays. Cross-sectional variation in asset returns is explained by the distribution of ownership.
Our analysis could not be conducted in the one-asset model of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] , which examines the impact of liquidity on asset prices only by comparative-statics results. For instance, in the one-asset model, an increase in the quantity of shareholders results in a positive shift of the supply curve, and thus decreases the price of the asset. In the multiple-assets model, we can keep the total quantity of shareholders constant, and study an equilibrium in which some assets have more shareholders than others. This isolates a liquidity effect: An asset with more shareholders is easier to find, and has a higher price.
Search-theoretic approaches to liquidity have been explored in the monetary literature, following Kiyotaki and Wright [1989] . Most notably, Wallace [2000] focuses on the relative liquidity of intrinsically worthless assets (currency) and assets earning a positive dividend (bonds). The model we present here has no room for currency, and focuses on assets with relatively homogeneous characteristics. This paper is closely related to the independent work of Vayanos and Wang [2002] . They provide a two-asset extension of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] with heterogeneous investors and partially segmented markets, in order to study liquidity differences between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. By contrast, the focus here on the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns prompts us to address an arbitrary number of assets. We allow investors to search simultaneously for several assets, by allocating their search effort to the various assets.
The last section of the paper addresses time variation in liquidity. Specifically, we study the dynamic impact of news about "asset fundamentals." Good news about an asset is represented by a permanent increase in its dividend rate. When the news is announced, investors start aggressively searching for this asset, causing a temporary increase in its trading volume. As the asset is aggressively purchased, it becomes progressively harder to buy. Once this decrease in liquidity compensates for the increase in dividend rate, trading volume goes back to normal, and the economy slowly approaches its new steady-state. Our study suggests that time variation in liquidity has a small impact on the level of prices (analogous to Constantinides [1986] ), but may have a temporary non-negligible impact on capital gains, hence on returns.
Trading Many Assets
This section presents the basic model, in which investors cannot buy and sell assets instantly. Rather, they allocate search resources to asset-specific "trading specialists," who search for counterparties. When two investors meet, they bargain over the terms of trade. (The specialists could bargain on their behalves.)
The Economic Environment
This subsection describes the model setup.
Information, Preferences and Technology
Time is treated continuously, and runs forever. The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral infinitely-lived investors whose total measure is normalized, without loss of generality, to 1. An investor has, at each time, either a high or a low liquidity need, modeled by the level of a randomly varying shock to her marginal utility for consumption. Specifically, with a high liquidity need, an investor values immediate lumps of consumption ("cash") over streams of consumption ("dividends") by a factor of 1/(1 − α) for some α ∈ (0, 1). With a low liquidity need, this factor is 1. This creates gains from trade: An investor with a high liquidity need is willing to sell her asset to an investor with a low liquidity need, in exchange for a lump of consumption. Investors switch randomly, and pair-wise independently, from a high liquidity need to a low liquidity need with intensity 2 γ d , and from a low need to a high need with intensity γ u . Any two 2 Specifically, liquidity need is a Markov chain. If an investor has high liquidity need, the investors have pair-wise independent liquidity-need processes. In order to allow for side payments, investors are endowed with a technology to instantly produce lumps of consumption for each other, at unit marginal cost. Lastly, investors can hold at most one unit of any asset, and cannot shortsell.
Asset Characteristics
The set of asset types is {1, . . . , K}. One share of asset k pays the constant dividend rate d > 0 forever. We impose two constraints on an investors' asset holdings. First, an investor is permited to hold at most one share of an asset.
3
Second, an investor can hold only one type of asset (other segmentation stories might be applied). These two assumptions imply that s k is the fraction of the population holding asset k. In order to make the demand side of the economy nontrivial, we assume that s ≡ K k=1 s k < 1.
Definition 1 (Distribution of Ownership.) A distribution of ownership is some S = (s 1 , . . . , s K ) ∈ R K + , quantities of shareholders of each asset, such that
Investor Types
An investor's type is made up of her liquidity need (high h, or low l), and her ownership status (owner ok, or nonowner n), for each asset type k ∈ {1, . . . K}. Hence, the set of investor types is I = {ln, hn, lo1, . . . , loK, ho1, . . . , hoK}.
For each i ∈ I, we let µ i denote the fraction of investors of type i, and, given the asset fundamentals and the trading environment (to be defined), we let V i denote the continuation utility of an investor of type i. A precise definition of V i is provided in Appendix 2.
Random Matching
At any point in time, each investor is endowed with a unit mass of "trading specialists" who search for specific trading counterparties, in a sense that is now to be described. A trading specialist of type (i, j) ∈ I 2 works for an investor of type i, and specializes in contacting specialists working for investors of type j. distribution of the next switching time to the low-need state is exponential with parameter γ d . The successive switching times are independent.
3 Normalizing the maximum asset holding to be one share is without loss of generality, in the following sense. Our results would remain unchanged if we assume a maximum asset holding of N shares, and redefine the dividend rate to be d/N . Thus, contacts that could result in a trade occur only between specialists of types (i, j) and (j, i).
An investor of type i maintains on her "trading staff" a quantity ν ij of specialists of type (i, j), subject to the resource constraint j∈I ν ij ≤ν, which we take to be 1 as a normalization. Thus, the fraction of specialists of type (i, j) in the entire specialist population is µ i ν ij . A given specialist makes contacts with other specialists pair-wise independently at Poisson arrival times, with intensity λ > 0. Contacts are also pair-wise independent with the liquidity-need processes. Given a contact, because of the random matching assumption, the probability that the contact is made with a specialist of type (i, j) is µ i ν ij . That is, conditional on making a contact, all trading specialists in the entire specialist population are "equally likely" to be contacted. Adapting the usual random-matching assumption that the Law of Large Numbers applies (see, for instance, Diamond [1982] ), contacts between specialists of types (i, j) and (j, i), for i = j, occur continually at a total (almost sure) rate of
The first term on the left-hand side of (3) is the total rate of contacts made by all specialists of type (i, j), and received by specialists of type (j, i). Specifically, each specialist of the mass µ i ν ij of specialists of type (i, j) makes contacts at rate λ, and such contacts are received by some specialist of type (j, i) with probability µ j ν ji . Similarly, the second term is the total rate of contact made by specialists of type (j, i) and received by specialists of type (i, j). For each investor of type i, λ ij ≡ λν ij is the intensity of contacts with some other specialists, made by the mass ν ij of specialists of type (i, j). Thus, we can view an investor of type i as endowed with a budget λ > 0 of search effort and allocating some intensity λ ij to the search for investors of type j, subject to the ressource constraint j∈I λ ij ≤ λ. With this new notation, adopted for the remainder of the paper, the total (almost sure) rate of contact between investors of types i and j is
An investor maintaining trading specialists can be viewed as an investment firm with separate units that trade specific securities. A typical unit trades securities of a specific industry, such as "telecom" or "entertainment," or trades securities with a specific payoff structure, such as fixed-income or derivatives. Specialization in trading reflects the costs of collecting and processing information regarding the supply and demand of assets, as well as the fundamentals of the underlying cash flows.
This search-theoretic model abstracts from a decentralized security market, such as the NASDAQ or some other over-the-counter markets. One may argue that, in these markets, search frictions are largely overcome by marketmakers who stand ready to buy and sell assets. However, as Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] show, trading frictions remain relevant if trade is bilateral and investors meet marketmakers sequentially. In such environments, search frictions determine the reservation values of investors bargaining with marketmakers, which in turn affect bid and ask prices.
Equilibrium
We now study the decisions of investors: whether or not to trade in a given encounter, and how to allocate search intensity across types of trading encounters. We then describe the dynamics of the distribution of types. Lastly, we define an equilibrium.
Trade Among Investors
Trade between investors of types i and j occurs at a strictly positive rate if (a) the gain from trade from such a pair is strictly positive, 4 and (b) these two types of investors maintain trading specialists who are searching for each other, that is, if λ ij λ ji > 0.
In equilibrium, we anticipate that the gains from trade are strictly positive between the following types of investor pairings. First, when a high-liquidityneed owner (one of type hok) contacts a low-liquidity-need non-owner (of type ln) the hok investor may sell her asset to the ln investor, in exchange for a lump of consumption. Second, when an hok investor contacts an loj investor, they may swap assets, and one investor may simultaneously transfer a lump of consumption to the other. These lumps of consumption are instantly produced, at unit marginal cost. Any (hok, loj) pair does not necessarily have a profitable swap, and hok investors do not necessarily search for swaps.
The terms of trade between an ln and an hok investor arise in a simple Nash bargaining game. The total surplus of such a transaction is (V lok − V ln ) − (V hok − V hn ) ≡ ∆V lk − ∆V hk . We study those equilibria in which the hok agent receives a fixed fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of the total surplus. This implies that the price of asset k is, in an equilibrium,
Similarly, the total surplus of a swap between a hok agent and a loj agent is V hoj − V hok + V lok − V loj . When this surplus is positive, then trade might take place. As before, we assume that the hok agent received a fixed fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of the total surplus. Simple manipulations shows that this implies that the hok agents transfers to the loj agents p j − p k of consumption good. We anticipate an equilibrium in which hok investors do not maintain trading specialists who search for loj investors, but only trading specialists who search for ln investors. In other words, the net utility of searching for an asset swap will turn out to be strictly less than the net utility of searching for an outright sale, under natural conditions. In other words we anticipate that
for all (k, j) ∈ {1, . . . , K} 2 . Hence, a hok investor allocates all of her search intensity λ to the search for ln investors. On the other hand a ln investor allocates intensities, denoted λ 1 , . . . , λ K , to searches for investors of respective types ho1, . . . , hoK.
Definition 2 A search intensity allocation is some
Investors' Problems and the Distribution of Types
We first characterize the equilibrium continuation utilities V i , i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. We use the unit "lump of consumption" as a numeraire. As shown in Appendix 2, these solve the system of Bellman Equations:
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The maximization in (7) is subject to K k=1 λ k ≤ λ and λ k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The upper-case and lower-case notation is used to distinguish the search intensity Λ k that will prevail in equilibrium for all investors of type ln, from the intensity λ k that is to be chosen by an individual investor of type ln, taking others' search intensities as given.
Given a search-intensity allocation Λ, the distribution µ ≡ (µ ln , µ hn , µ hok , µ lok ) of types solves the system
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The system (11)- (14) implies that, in a steady-state, for each type, the rate of change of the quantity of investors of that type is zero. For instance, in (11), γ d µ ln is the instantaneous flow of investors of type hn migrating to the ln type, γ u µ ln is the instantaneous flow of investors of type ln migrating to the hn type, and 2Λ k µ ln µ hok is the instantaneous flow of investors of type ln who buy an asset of type k, migrating to the lok type.
Steady-State Symmetric Equilibrium
Definition 3 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is a collection V = (V ln , V lok , V hok , V hn ) 1≤k≤K of continuation utilities, a distribution µ = (µ ln , µ lok , µ hok , µ hn ) 1≤k≤K of types, and a search intensity allocation Λ 0, such that (i) Steady-State: Given Λ, µ solves the system (11)-(16).
(ii) Optimality: Given Λ, and µ, V and (λ 1 , . . . , λ K ) = Λ solve the system (7)- (10) of Bellman equations. The no-swap conditions (6) holds for all
With this definition, we restrict attention to equilibria having two specific properties: there are no swap and all assets are searched, that is Λ 0. 5 In particular, since (7) is a linear program, Λ 0 implies that ln investors are indifferent between searching for any two assets. Hence, the first-order condition of the ln investor's problem, (7), is
for all (k, j) ∈ {1, . . . , K} 2 . This reflects "search indifference," meaning that the marginal utility of spending an additional unit of search intensity on a given asset must is equated across assets. This marginal utility is decomposed as follows: Conditional on establishing a contact, a seller of asset k is found with probability µ hok . Then, the buyer receives a fraction 1 − q of the transaction surplus ∆V lk − ∆V hk .
We may interpret the total transaction surplus as the bid-ask spread, in the following sense. We consider the economy in a steady-state equilibrium and we introduce an "infinitesimal" market-maker.
6 If this marketmaker can make takeit-or-leave-it offers to investors, he charges ∆V lk to buyers of asset k (the ask price), and pays ∆V hk to sellers of asset k (the bid price). In other words, we identify the buyer's reservation value with the ask, and the seller's revervation value with the bid. Following this interpretation, condition (17) implies that an asset that is easier to find (with a larger µ hok ) has a narrower bid-ask spread. This suggests a negative relationship between liquidity and bid-ask spread.
Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we provide technical conditions under which an equilibrium exists and is unique. We first analyze the steady-state distribution of types. Second, in order to prove the existence of an equilibrium, we study the indifference conditions (17).
Steady-State Distribution of Types
In this paragraph, we study the system (11)-(16), given a search intensity allocation Λ. Since equation (15) implies that the sum of (12) and (14) is zero, we can eliminate (12). Similarly, since equation (16) implies that the sum of equations (11) to (13) is zero, we can eliminate (14). We finally obtain the reduced system
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The study of (18)- (21) presented in Appendix 1 shows the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given a search intensity allocation Λ, the system (18)- (21) has a unique solution
Search-indifference
The equilibrium conditions can be written as a system of K − 1 equations in K − 1 unknowns; namely, the search-indifference marginal conditions (17) may be viewed as an equation f (Λ) = 0 ∈ R K−1 , to be solved for Λ. This equation is as follows. Through (18)- (21), we map a search intensity allocation Λ into a unique stationary distribution µ of types. Then, solving the linear system (7)- (9) of Bellman equations, we may write µ hok (1 − q)(∆V lk − ∆V hk ) = w k (Λ), for some function w k ( · ). We express the "search-indifference" marginal condition (17) as
for k = 1, . . . , K, and for some positive constant W to be determined. In order to solve for the equilibrium W , we may first solve the system (22) for Λ, for any given W > 0. This allows us to write
We use (23) as a "necessary condition" for equilibria. In order to derive (23), we combine the Bellman equations (7)- (10) with equation (18) to show that w k (Λ) is defined implicitly by
Then, equation (18) implies that
Substituting (25) into (24), imposing w k (Λ) = W , and rearranging gives
This quadratic equation allow us to write µ hok = m k (W ), for some W > 2λ/αd and for some continuous and increasing function m k ( · ). Combining (18) and (19), we find that
We substitute (27) into (25) to find that l k (W ) of (23) is defined implicitly by
which, in turn, shows that
The left-hand side of (29) is increasing in W because m k ( · ) is increasing for each k. Hence, (29) uniquely characterizes a candidate equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness.) There is at most one equilibrium.
We first analyze the case of identical asset characteristics. We fix a distribution S = (ŝ/K, . . . ,ŝ/K), of ownership, for some positive constantsŝ. We show the existence of a symmetric equilibrium withΛ k = λ/K, following Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] . Then, in order to prove local existence, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (29), around this symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Existence.) LetŜ = (ŝ/K, . . . ,ŝ/K). Then, there is a neighborhood N ⊂ R K + ofŜ, such that, for all S ∈ N , there is an equilibrium.
Proof. If the assets have identical characteristics, it is natural to guess that there is a symmetric equilibrium, withμ hok =μ ho /K andΛ k = λ/K. The equilibrium equations are those of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] , with "λ" there being replaced here by "λ/K." Their results imply that investors' values are strictly positive, and that there are strictly positive gains from trade between investors of types ln and hok. Furthermore, since assets have identical characteristics, there is no gain from swapping assets. Thus, hok investors strictly prefer searching for a sell with an ln investor to searching for a swap with an loj investor, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Since the left-hand side of (29) is strictly increasing in W , we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem. This provides a neighborhood N ⊂ R K + ofŜ, such that, for all S ∈ N , there exists a candidate equilibrium W = h(S), for some continuous function h( · ). The other candidate equilibrium objects (V, µ, Λ) are easily expressed as continuous functions of W and thus as continuous functions of S. The search-indifference conditions (22) are satisfied by construction. All other relevant inequalities hold by continuity.
The proof shows in particular that, if assets characteristics are sufficiently homogeneous, hok investors are not searching for swaps. This follows from the fact that the net utility of swapping two assets with nearly identical characteristics is close to zero and turns out to be strictly less than the net utility of searching for an outright sale.
Does there always exist an equilibrium in which all assets are traded? We provide a partial answer, in a two-asset economy. Specifically, we show that if the assets have sufficiently different supplies, there cannot be an equilibrium in which both are traded, in the following sense.
Proposition 4 (Non-Existence.) Consider a two-asset economy (K = 2). Assume that these assets pay the same dividend rate, that Asset 1 is in supply s 1 > 0, and that Asset 2 is in supply s − s 1 > 0. Then there is a ε > 0 such that, for any s 1 < ε, an equilibrium cannot exists.
Proof. We consider a two-asset economy with s 1 = ε > 0 and s 2 = s − ε > 0. We show that, if ε is small enough, we cannot construct a candidate equilibrium in which Λ 0. If such an equilibrium exists, both assets satisfy (26). For Asset 1, we observe that since µ ho1 ≤ s 1 = ε, (26) implies that the candidate W goes to zero as ε goes to zero. In turn, for Asset 2, (26) implies that µ ho2 goes to zero as ε goes to zero. But then s 2 /µ ho2 = (1 − ε)/µ ho2 goes to infinity as ε goes to zero. Therefore, equation (29) cannot hold.
Existence in Proposition 3, and non-existence in Proposition 4, are proved by studying how equation (29) depends on S. When asset characteristics are sufficiently similar, we can show that the equation has a solution. Alternatively, when the quantity of shareholders of an asset is sufficiently small relative to quantities of shareholders of other assets, we can show that there is no solution.
An equilibrium may fail to exist because, when s 1 is small, the probability of finding a seller is even smaller. An investor is willing to search for this asset only if she is compensated by a sufficiently low price. If s 1 is small enough, the appropriate compensation results in a negative price, and thus cannot be the basis of an equilibrium.
The Pricing of Liquidity Differences
In this section, we analyze the pricing implications of the model. First, we explain the pricing of liquidity. Then, we derive a float-adjusted return model or FARM: in equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its dollar free-float. The dollar free-float of asset k is φ k ≡ p k µ hok , the portion of market capitalization that is available for sale. Lastly, we show how crosssectional variation in asset prices is explained by the distribution of ownership.
Cross-sectional Prices
The pricing equation (5) can be written
The first term on the right hand side, ∆V lk , is the reservation value of a ln investor. The second term is the discount obtained by a ln investor with bargaining power 1 − q. Subtracting the Bellman equations (7) from (8), we derive an expression for the reservation value ∆V lk . Substituting it in (30), we obtain
This equation breaks up the price of asset k into four components. The first component d is the flow value of dividend payments. The second component 2λW is the flow value of searching for an asset. A ln investor obtains this discount because he has the option of not buying asset k and continuing his search. The third term γ u (∆V lk − ∆V hk ) is the instantaneous cost of switching to the high liquidity need state, and not being able to sell the asset instantly. The last term is the bargaining discount.
It is instructive to compare the price p k of the asset in this dynamic bargaining market with its price p ∞ k in a Walrasian market, where all assets can be bought and sold instantly. When the aggregate supply of asset is less than the steadystate fraction of low liquidity need investors (that is s < γ d /(γ u + γ d )), the marginal investor in a Walrasian market has a low liquidity need, implying that p
In other words, all discounts in equation (31) are equal to zero. First, because the net-utility of buying an asset is equal to zero, the flow value of "searching" for an alternative asset asset is also equal to zero. Second, because the asset can be sold instantly, the cost of switching to the high liquidity need state is equal to zero. Third, because sellers can find alternative buyers instantly, the buyer's bargaining discount is equal to zero.
A Float Adjusted Return Model
The price p L of a hypothetical 'infinitely liquid' asset, named asset L, is defined as
This price makes a ln investor indifferent between (i) searching for some asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (ii) buying asset L instantly, stopping search, and having the option to sell the asset instantly at price p L . We call asset L 'infinitely liquid' because it can be bought and sold instantly. Its price includes the discount 2λW because ln investors must be compensated from stopping search. However, since asset L can be sold instantly at price p L , the cost of switching to the high liquidity need state is equal to zero.
7 Subtracting equation (32) from equation (30) and rearranging, we find
Together with the search-indifference condition (17), (33) implies that
where W is the net-utility of searching for alternative assets. We let
be respectively the return of asset k and the return of asset L.
We let φ k ≡ p k µ hok be the dollar free-float of asset k, the portion of its market capitalization available for sale. Equation (34) states that, in equilibrium, the liquidity spread R k − R L of asset k is proportional to the inverse of its dollar freefloat φ k . A convenient expression for the constant of proportionality is obtained by summing equations (34) over k. The result is summarized in
Proposition 5 (Float Adjusted Return Formula, FARM) In equilibrium, an asset liquidity spread is proportional to the inverse of its dollar free-float. Namely, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
where
is the dollar free-float of asset k,φ is the average dollar free-float in the market, φ ≡ 1/K K k=1 φ k , and R M is the return on a float-weighted portfolio
In (35), the float-weighted portfolio is viewed as an asset with the average (rather than the aggregate) stock market free-floatφ. When studying the impact of liquidity on cross-sectional returns, many researchers estimate linear models. They first control for risk with a factor model such as Sharpe [1964] CAPM, or Fama and French [1993] three-factors. Then, they test the statistical significance of additional independent variables that proxy for liquidity, such as bid-ask spread, trading volume, or market capitalization. The FARM (35) suggests that, with the type of linear models that are commonly estimated in the empirical literature, liquidity would be best measured by the dollar free-float.
Explaining Cross-Sectional Returns
In the previous subsection, we explained the cross-sectional variation in asset returns by the cross-sectional variation in dollar free-float, which is an endogenous variable. In this subsection, we take a step back and explain the cross-sectional variation in asset returns by an exogenous variable, the distribution of ownership S = (s 1 , . . . , s K ).
Here, the cross-sectional variation in asset returns is not explained by an exogenously specified cross-sectional variation in transaction costs, in contrast with the Walrasian models of Amihud and Mendelson [1986] , Constantinides [1986] , Vayanos [1998], and Huang [2002] . In our model, because of the search friction, investors cannot find buyers and sellers of specific assets instantly, and because investors are impatient, the likelihoods of finding those buyers and sellers in a short time are reflected in prices. One may view the cross-sectional variation in the likelihood of finding buyers and sellers as the natural counterpart of a cross-sectional variation in transaction costs. This cross-sectional variation is not, however, exogenously specified. Rather it arises endogenously and is explained by the distribution of ownership.
In order to derive the cross-sectional relationship between returns and distribution of ownership S, we use the following three equations. The main equation is the asset pricing equation (30) written as
The right-hand side is increasing in µ hok . In other words, an asset that is easier to find (one with larger µ hok ) is sold at a higher price. The second equation (26) is of the form
for some positive constants A, B, and C, which do not depend on k. The third equation is easily derived from (18), and relates Λ k to the distribution of types and s k :
The quantity Λ k µ ln has several interpretations. First, it represents the demand side of the market. The larger is Λ k , the more search occurs for asset k, and the easier it is to sell this asset. It is natural to ask whether an asset that is easier to sell is also easier to find. That is, can one view Λ k µ ln as an increasing function of µ hok ? Equation (39) shows that the answer depends on the quantity s k of shareholders, and is thus indeterminate at this stage of the analysis.
Second, Λ k µ ln is negatively related to the mean holding period of asset k. We consider an lok investor at a given time t and we let her holding period be τ h . We decompose τ h as follows. The investor holds the asset k until she switches to a state of high liquidity need at some time t + τ u , where τ u is an exponentially distributed stopping time with parameter γ u . Then, she either meets a buyer or switches back to a low liquidity need at some time t + τ u + min{τ b , τ d }, where τ b and τ d are exponentially distributed stopping times with respective parameters 2Λ k µ ln and γ d . If she switches back to low liquidity need, then her mean holding period is some stopping timeτ h . Hence,
In a steady state equilibrium,τ h and τ h are identically distributed. Furthermore, all the above stopping times are pairwise independent. Taking expectation on both sides of (40), and using the fact that τ h andτ h are identically distributed, we find
Equation (38) has the form
for some function F ( · , · ) that is increasing in s k and decreasing in µ hok . This implies that µ hok is increasing in s k . In other words, an asset with more shareholders is easier to find, is sold at a higher price, and has a lower return R k = d/p k . In order to derive a relationship between the quantity s k of shareholders and the mean holding period (41), we write equation (38) as
for some function G( · , · ) that is decreasing in s k and decreasing in µ hok /s k . This implies that µ hok /s k is a decreasing function of s k . From (39), it follows that Λ k µ ln is an increasing function of s k . In other words, an asset with more shareholders has a shorter mean holding period. Lastly, since the total rate of contact between buyers and sellers of asset k is 2Λ k µ ln µ hok , an asset with more shareholders also has a larger trading volume. The above discussion is summarized in
In words, an asset with more shareholders is easier to find, easier to sell, has a higher price, a lower return, and a narrower bid-ask spread. This implies in turn that it also has a larger trading volume, a larger turnover, and a shorter mean-holding period.
This model generates a positive relationship between returns and holding periods with ex-ante identical investors, because returns and holding periods are both negatively related to a common exogenous "liquidity" factor, the quantity of shareholders. By contrast, in Amihud and Mendelson [1986] , the holding period itself is an exogenous parameter. A positive relationship between returns and holding periods also arises endogenously in general equilibrium models with transaction costs, such as those of Vayanos and Villa [1999] or Huang [2002] , but for a different reason. In these models, assets can be bought and sold instantly, and an investor choose to hold assets with larger transaction costs for a longer periods. These assets, in equilibrium, have higher expected returns. In our model, an asset cannot be bought and sold instantly, and an asset with a higher return is harder to sell, and thus has a longer mean holding period.
Cross-Sectional Returns and Liquidity
The objective of this section is to confront the qualitative predictions of the theoretical model with empirical evidence. After a brief review of the empirical literature that relates cross-sectional asset returns to liquidity factors, we compute an equilibrium of the theoretical model. For a "random" cross section of 200 assets, we show how returns are related to liquidity factors.
Empirical Evidence
Amihud and Mendelson [1986] and Amihud and Mendelson [1989] propose an empirical analysis of the "liquidity-premium hypothesis." They study monthly returns on portfolios of NYSE stocks, over the period 1961-1981. They proxy for liquidity with the relative bid-ask spread, in line with their theoretical model, in which the relative bid-ask spread is an exogenous characteristic of the asset. Controlling for risk premia using a CAPM beta (Sharpe [1964] ), and for marketcapitalization, they show that there is a significant positive relationship between relative bid-ask spreads and expected returns. Subsequent studies have criticized aspects of their methodology, raising two main methodological questions. The first question is how to proxy for liquidity. Petersen and Fialkowski [1994] argued that the bid-ask spread is a poor measure of trading costs. They study market orders for 144 stocks listed on the NYSE, over the three-months period November 1990 to January 1991. They show that 50% of transactions do not occur at the quoted bid-ask spread.
8 The second question has been the degree of control for other factors than liquidity, most notably for systematic risk. When controlling for risk premia using CAPM betas, the econometrician is testing jointly the liquidity-premium hypothesis and the CAPM theory. A significant measured liquidity effect may reflect a failure of the CAPM and not necessarily evidence of a liquidity premium.
Alternative Measures of Liquidity
Eleswarapu [1997] studies monthly excess returns on portfolios of NASDAQ stocks, over the period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . He controls for risk premia, using a CAPM beta, and for market capitalization. Contrary to the evidence from the earlier cited NYSE study, most trades on NASDAQ occur at the quoted bid-ask spread. Furthermore, the observed variation in bid-ask spread is much larger across NASDAQ stocks than across NYSE stocks. This suggests that a test of NASDAQ data may have more power to reject the null of no liquidity premium. Eleswarapu's results indicate that liquidity is indeed priced.
Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1996] study monthly excess returns on portfolios of NYSE stocks, over the period 1984-1991. They do not rely on the quoted bid-ask spread, but estimate fixed and proportional trading costs from intraday transactions. In their cross-sectional regressions, the estimated trading cost is positively related to return, after controlling for risk using the three factors of Fama and French [1993] .
Other authors such as Haugen and Baker [1996] , Hu [1997] , and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam [1998] , relate liquidity to trading activity. An asset is said to be more liquid if it is traded more frequently and in larger (dollar) quantities. This may reflect the opportunity to conduct a large trade without a large price impact.
Haugen and Baker [1996] study monthly returns on individual stocks listed in the Russell 3000 index, over the period 1979-1993. In their regressions, they use four liquidity factors: market capitalization, market price per share, a ratio of monthly dollar trading volume to market capitalization, as well as the trend of this ratio. In addition, they include factors indicating risk, price level, and growth potential, as well as sector variables and technical factors. The ratio of monthly dollar trading volume to market capitalization, which one may interpret as a measure of turnover, appears to be the most important liquidity factor and to be negatively related to expected returns.
Hu [1997] studies monthly returns of stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Ex-change, over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . He measures liquidity with trading turnover, the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. His regressors include market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and cash-flow-toprice ratio. He finds a statistically and economically significant negative relationship between expected returns and turnover. Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam [1998] study monthly excess returns on individual stocks traded on NYSE and NASDAQ, over the period 1966-1995. They control for liquidity with the dollar trading volume, for risk with either the three factor of Fama and French, or the method of Connor and Korajczyk [1988] that is based on asymptotic principal components. The non-risk factors used by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam [1998] include the price, a measure of dividend yield, and lagged returns. They find that the dollar trading volume of an asset is negatively related to its expected excess return.
Controlling for Risk
These cited studies use various factor models in order to control for risk premia. As mentioned above, a significant measured liquidity effect may reflect a misspecification of the factor model. We now review some work that attempts to avoid this criticism. Amihud and Mendelson [1991] compare expected returns among securities with similar risk characteristics. They focus on two government securities, treasury bills (shorter maturity), and treasury notes (longer maturity). They match bills and notes with the same maturity date, cash-flow, and risk. Their sample covers 37 trading days, between April and November 1987, and includes bills and notes with less than 6 months to maturity. Amihud and Mendelson's presumption is that notes are much less liquid than bills of the same time to maturity: Since notes have been traded for a longer period, part of their supply has been "locked away" in investors portfolios. Amihud and Mendelson find that notes have significantly higher yields to maturity and larger bid-ask spreads, supporting their presumption that notes are less liquid than bills. In a related work, Warga [1992] study rate of return difference between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. He constructs bond porfolios with constant (Macaulay) duration, an alternative to the "constant time to maturity" criterion of Amihud and Mendelson [1991] . For each duration, he forms an "on-the-run" portfolio, composed of bonds issued in the most recent treasury auction, as well as an "off-the-run" portfolio, composed of all other bonds. The estimated mean return of the on-the-run portfolios appears to be smaller than the one of the off-the-run portfolios, uniformly across durations. This might reflect liquidity differences, or tax-treatment difference. The author proxy for tax-treatment and finds that the associated coefficient is statistically insignificant. Kadlec and McConnell [1994] study the prices of NASDAQ securities that obtained a NYSE listing during the 1980-1989 period. Since trading costs appear to be smaller on the NYSE than on the NASDAQ (see, among others, Huang and Stoll [1996] ), the authors expect after-listing prices to reflect better market liquidity. They measure liquidity with the bid-ask spread, controling for the increase in shareholders base (Merton [1987] ) and for the "good news" associated with a NYSE listing. They find a positive relationship between bid-ask spreads and returns.
Cross-Sectional Returns: An Example
This section presents a numerical example suggesting that the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this paper are qualitatively consistent with much of the evidence from the empirical literature.
An equilibrium of the model is computed for a randomly generated economy of K = 200 asset types. 9 The ownerships s k are drawn independently from uniform distributions on an intervals [s 1 , s 2 ]. The dividend rate d is set to 1. The bargaining powers q 1 , . . . , q K , of sellers of assets 1, . . . , K, are drawn indendently from an uniform distribution on intervals [q 1 , q 2 ]. This is a simple way to check the robustness of the results to the introduction of other forms of asset heterogeneity. The equilibrium return R k = d/p k is plotted against various measures of liquidity used in the empirical literature, which have direct counterparts in our theoretical model. The relative bid-ask spread is 1 − ∆V hk /∆V lk . The dollar trading volume is p k µ hok Λ k µ ln . The turnover is µ hok Λ k µ ln /s k . The market capitalization (size) is p k s k . The values of the exogenous parameters are as in Table 1 .
The unit of time is one year. Assuming that the stock market opens 250 days a year and that there are 10 trading hours per day, λ = 12000 means that an investor establishes a contact every 12.5 minutes, on average. The discount rate r is 5%. Given the chosen uniform distribution for s k , the expected aggregate supply of assets, E K k=1 s k , is 0.2. As in Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [2001] , an investor has a high liquidity need, on average, for 1 year out of every 11 years. Figure 1 displays the results of the computations. Returns and bid-ask spreads are positively related. In contrast with the theoretical results of Amihud and Mendelson [1986] , the relationship is almost linear and not concave. Consistently with the empirical evidence, returns are negatively related to market capitalization, turnover, and trading volume. The holding period is positively related to returns. 
The Impact of News on Liquidity
We now turn from the steady-state cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, toward some of the time-series implications of our model of liquidity, constructing some examples that shed light on the dynamic impact of news on prices and returns. News regarding "fundamentals," such as the dividend rates, cause investors to deviate from their steady-state search allocations. This has an impact on the distribution of investors' types, and as a consequence the likelihood of finding buyers and sellers of given types. Specifically, when news regarding fundamentals is announced, investors are no longer indifferent between searching for any two assets, and the distribution of investors' types must adjust in order to eventually restore indifference. Because investors need to contact each other in order to trade, the distribution of investors' types cannot adjust instantly. We construct a numerical approximation of the search-intensity allocation along the equilibrium path. Because an investor's search-intensity allocation solves a linear program, it typically features jumps from corner to corner. In order to ensure the smoothness of the policy function, and to apply standard solution methods, we incorporate a small, strictly concave penalty function into the search optimization problem of an ln investor. This provides an approximation of this optimization problem. We conjecture that the equilibrium constructed on the basis of this approximation approximates an equilibrium for the actual underlying model. In any case, there are in practice costs to changing the allocation of search efforts. In Appendix 3, we describe the numerical method in detail.
We consider a two-asset economy (K = 2) described in Table 2 . Our two experiments share the following features. At t < 0, the economy is in a steadystate equilibrium, where agents anticipate a one-time Poisson arrival of a piece of news, with intensity η > 0. At t = 0, a piece of news regarding the assets' characteristics is announced. Figures 10 2 to 5 display the "transitional dynamics" of equilibrium quantities, for t > 0.
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Permanent Increases in Dividend Rates
10 The unit of time for the rates and intensities in Table 2 is one year. In our numerical experiments, the economy is close to its new steady state after a few hours of trading. As a result, the time unit in the Figures is in "hours." Years are converted in hours assuming 250 trading days per year and 10 hours of trading per day.
11 The characteristics of the economy at t < 0 (the "initial conditions") depend on the path of the economy at t > 0 (the "transitional dynamics.") Hence, we need to solve a fixed point problem described by the following algorithm. Given some candidate initial conditions, we solve for transitional dynamics using the numerical method described in Appendix 3. Then, given some candidate transitional dynamics, we compute the value of searching for assets k = 1, 2 at the time of the announcement t = 0, and then solve for the corresponding initial conditions using the methods of Section 2.2. We iterate on this algorithm until convergence. This experiment describes the effect of an 10% permanent increase in the dividend rate d 1 , which one could interpret as an unexpected piece of good news regarding the long run profitability of the firm issuing Asset 1. 12 The results are displayed in Figures 2 and 3 .
The dividend increase temporarily makes Asset 1 more attractive. As a result, investors search for Asset 1 with an intensity close to their full budget λ. This causes µ ho1 to decrease rapidly and µ ho2 to increase rapidly. In other words, Asset 2 becomes relatively more liquid than Asset 1. This change in relative liquidity compensates for the change in dividend so as to make investors nearly indifferent between searching for both assets. Near indifference is achieved after about an hour of heavy trading, by which time investors' search intensity allocations have moved close to their new steady-state values.
In the new steady-state, µ ho1 < µ ho2 , but Λ 1 > Λ 2 . Because investors seek it more aggressively, Asset 1 is harder to find and easier to sell. Liquidity deteriorates for buyers but improves for seller. The "net" effect may be measured by turnover: Asset 1 is more heavily traded than Asset 2 and this is reflected in returns.
At t = 0, the prices of both assets jump close to the levels that are their new steady-state values. Because Asset 1 is initially more liquid than in the new steady-state, its price is slightly larger than its steady-state value. It subsequently decreases, as liquidity deteriorates. The price impact of time variation in liquidity appears to be small, in line with the results of Constantinides [1986] . Since, on the other hand, the time derivatives of prices are not small, the impact on instantaneous returns (through capital gains), is not negligible in the short run. 
Temporary Increases in Dividend Rates
The previous paragraph considers a permanent dividend increase, that one could view as a piece of news regarding the long-run relative profitability of the firm issuing Asset 1. We now consider a temporary dividend rate increase. Specifically, the dividend d 1 is increased at t = 0 by 10% from its old level, and then decays exponentially, with a one-hour half life. (That is,ḋ 1 = νd 1 , where ν is set so that As in the previous experiment, Asset 1 is more attractive and initially investors search for it more aggressively. Its liquidity deteriorates while the liquidity of Asset 2 improves. As Asset 1 becomes harder to find, and has a smaller dividend, Asset 2 becomes the most attractive. Then, investors seek Asset 2 more aggressively. The liquidity of Asset 1 improves, while that of Asset 2 deteriorates. The humped-shaped pattern for the time path of µ ho2 (t) is expected because the initial increase in the dividend d 1 rate is temporary, and all variables eventually revert toward their steady-state values. The reversion in liquidity is also illustrated by the turnover: The turnover of Asset 1 is initially larger than that of Asset 2, but becomes smaller after about half an hour of heavy trading.
Conclusion
This paper uses a search-theoretic model to study the impact of heterogeneity in asset liquidity on the cross section and the time series of asset returns. The main result of the paper is the float-adjusted return model, or FARM: in equilibrium, the liquidity spread on an asset is proportional to the inverse of its dollar freefloat. Hence, the dollar free-float is a measure of liquidity that is consistent with the linear specifications used in most empirical studies of the liquidity spread. Although the search technology is the same for all assets, heterogeneous bidask spreads arise endogenously. Cross-sectional variation in returns is explained by cross-sectional variation in share ownership. Theoretical and numerical results shows that the model generates key qualitative facts documented in the empirical literature. The out-of-steady-state dynamics shed light on the short-term impact of news. The price impact is generally small, but the return impact is not negligible at a high frequency. The model suggests that even moderate unexpected news may create temporary but sharp increases in trading volume. Further work might apply the insights of this model to an an empirical study of the cross-section of asset returns. It would be helpful to extend the current framework in order to incorporate both risk premia and stochastic variation in aggregate liquidity. , and Jean-Luc Villa, Equilibrium Interest Rate and Liquidity Premium with Transaction Costs, Economic Theory, 1999, 13, 509-539.
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Appendix 1: Dynamics of the Type Distribution
In this appendix, we study the dynamics of the distribution of types. We first solve for the steady-state, and then proves its local stability. For a given search intensity allocation Λ, the distribution µ(t) = (µ ln (t), µ lok (t), µ hok (t), µ hn (t)) 1≤k≤K of types solveμ
whereμ = dµ(t)/dt, and time arguments are suppressed. Since equation (48) implies that the sum of (45) and (47) is zero, we can eliminate (45), the ODE for µ lok . Similarly, since equation (49) implies that the sum of equations (44) to (47) is zero, we can eliminate (46), the ODE for µ hn . We obtain the equivalent systemμ
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Steady-State Distribution of Types, Proposition 1
A steady-state solves equations (50)- (53). Summing equations (50) over k, adding equation (51), and imposing the steady-state conditionμ = 0, we find
We replace this last equation in (50) to obtain
summing equations (55) over k, we obtain the one equation in one unknown problem
The left-hand side of this equation is increasing in µ ho , is negative at µ ho = 0, and is positive for µ ho large enough; thus, it has a unique solution. Once the solution µ ho is found, µ hok is uniquely determined by (55), µ ln by (54), and finally µ lok and µ hn by (52) and (53). This procedure characterizes a unique candidate steadystate. Since the steady-state fractions sum to one by construction, we only need to show that they are positive. We proceed as follows. The left-hand side of (56) is positive when evaluated at µ ho = s and 1 − y; it is negative when evaluated at s − y. Since the left hand side of (56) is increasing, this shows that
Next, s − y < µ ho implies that µ ln > 0 and that µ hok < s k . Finally, µ ho < 1 − y implies that µ ln < 1 − s and that 0 < µ hn < 1.
Local Stability
We now establish that, given Λ, the steady-state distribution of types is a locally stable point of the following ODĖ
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Stacking variables as (µ ho1 , . . . , µ hok , µ ln ) , the Jacobian of the ODE at the steady-state is
Lemma 1 (Local Stability.) The eigenvalues of J have strictly negative real parts.
Proof. Letting e denote the vector (1, . . . 1) , we have e D 11 = D 21 and e D 12 = D 22 .
We let x = 0 be an eigenvector of J associated with the eigenvalue ν ∈ C. We have
We multiply equation (61) by e , and subtract equation (62) to obtain
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: e x 1 = x 2 . From (63), it must be that ν = −(γ u + γ d ) < 0.
Case 2: e x 1 = x 2 = 0. Then (61) simplifies to (
Case 3: e x 1 = x 2 = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that x 2 = 1. We use (61) to solve, explicitly for x 1k ,
Since the x 1k sum to one, it must be that Re K k=1 x 1k = 1. Thus, there is one k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that Re(x 1k ) > 0, which is equivalent to Re(1/x 1k ) > 0 and, from equation (64), to Re(ν) < − (γ u + γ d + 2Λ k µ ln ) < 0.
Appendix 2: Formulating and Solving the Investor's Problem
This Appendix defines the stochastic control problem faced by an individual investor in a candidate steady-state equilibrium, and verifies that the Bellman equations (7)-(10) are sufficient for optimality.
A Candidate Steady-State Equilibrium
We first describe a candidate steady-state equilibrium as follows. There is a fraction µ i of investors of type i ∈ I, with search intensity allocations (Λ ij ) j∈I , consuming at the constant rate c(i).
The liquidity need process of an investor of type i switches with intensity λ s (i) > 0. To simplify notations, we describe switches of the liquidity need process as encounters with a "fictitious" investor s / ∈ I. We let H = I ∪ {s} be the set of possible encounters.
The terms of trade are described by a "transition function" σ : I × H → I, and a "payment function" p : I × H → R + . Specifically, when an investor of type i meets an investor of type j ∈ H, they either accept or reject the trade. If both accept, the investor of type i evolves to type σ(i, j) and makes a payment of p(i, j) to the investor of type j. If either of them reject the trade, no payment occurs and the investors stay at their preceding respective types. The candidate equilibrium strategy is to always accept the trade. Lastly, when an investor of type i meets the investor s, he evolves to one of type σ(i, s) and makes the payment p(i, s) = 0.
The Investor's Problem
We consider an individual investor with initial type i 0 . We fix a measurable space (Ω, F) and a measurable counting process N t = (N t (j)) j∈H where N t (j) ∈ N counts the numbers of encounters with investors of type j ∈ H in the time interval [0, t] . The process N t is associated with a sequence of encounter times 0 = T 0 < T 1 · · · < T n < · · · and a sequence of H-valued random variables j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j n , . . . such that, at t = T n , the investor encounters an investor of type j n . We let {F N t , t ≥ 0} be the internal history of (filtration generated by) the process N t .
Definition 4 (Admissible Controls.) An admissible control is some (F N t )-adapted process u t ≡ {β u t , λ u t , t ≥ 0}. The process {β u t , t ≥ 0} is the trading strategy. It is {0, 1}-valued and equal to 1 for all t ≥ 0 such that dN t (s) = 1. The process {λ u t , t ≥ 0} is the search intensity strategy. It is R I + -valued, leftcontinuous with right limit (LCRL), and such that j∈I λ u t (j) ≤ λ. We let U be the set of admissible controls.
The trading strategy describes the decision of accepting (β u t = 1) or rejecting (β u t = 0) the prescribed trade in an encounter occuring at time t (the type of the ecounter is known from the information filtration). The search intensity strategy describes how an investor uses her search effort over time. An admissible control u generates a I-valued type process X u t as follows:
An admissible control u ∈ U is associated with a probability P u on (Ω, F) such that N t admits the (P u − F N t ) intensity
for j ∈ I, and η
The consumption process associated with the admissible control u is defined by the stochastic differential equation
Definition 5 (Investor's Problem.) The lifetime utility of an investor with initial type i 0 applying some admissible control u ∈ U is
The investor's problem is to attain the optimal lifetime utility
Dynamic Programing
An admissible feedback v is some (δ v , θ v ) i∈I , where δ v : I × H → {0, 1} and
The set of admissible feedbacks is denoted V. With this notation, the system (7)-(10) of Bellman equations is
for all i ∈ I. In the text, we solve the Bellman equations (73) and we show that the maximum is achieved for some v * . This feedback is associated with the admissible control u * defined as follows. The trading strategy β u * t is defined recursively by
And the search intensity strategy λ
Proposition 7 (Sufficiency of the Bellman Equations.) The suppremum utility V i 0 is bounded above by J(i 0 ), and this upper bound is achieved by the admissible control u * .
Proof. We adapt the proof of Theorem VII,T1 in Brémaud [1981] . We consider an admissible control u ∈ U and write
where τ t = sup{T n , n ≥ 0 : T n ≤ t}. Equation (79) can be manipulated as follows: Since β u t (j)(J(σ(X u t − , j)−J(X u t − )−p(X u t − , j))e −rt is a bounded F N t -predictable process, it follows by theorem II, T8 in Brémaud [1981] that the last term on the right-hand side of (80) is a martingale. Taking expectations on both sides, and using the Bellman equation (73), we find 
with equality for u = u * , the admissible control associated with the v * that solves (73). Letting t go to infinity proves thatṼ io (u) ≤ J(X u 0 ), with equality if u = u * .
Because the search intensity allocation solves a linear program, it typically features jumps from corner to corner. A standard linear approximation relying on the differentiability of investors' policy function (see Judd [1999] ) cannot be used. To ensure smoothness of the policy function, we incorporate a barrier function into the objective of ln investors. Specifically, we write the system of Bellman equations:
rV ln = γ u (V hn − V ln ) + 2λW +V ln (87) rV lok = d k + γ u (V hok − V lok ) +V lok (88)
where the value V i of each type i and the value W of searching for assets are implicitly a function of time (t), andV i denote the derivative of V i (t) with respect to time. The value W of searching for assets is
where ε is a strictly positive constant and W k ≡ µ hok (1 − q)(∆V lk − ∆V hk ) > 0 denotes the net utility of searching for asset k. The maximization in (91) is subject to K k=1 λ k ≤ λ and λ k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Our "penalization" of the linear program in (91) amounts to assuming that it is costly to deviate from the steady-state search intensity allocation. The chosen specification (a "barrier function") guarantees that a solution is unique and interior.
With the penalized Bellman equations, a steady-state is defined, as before, as a collection (V, µ, Λ) ∈ R 5K+4 solving equations (83)- (86) and (87)- (91), in which the time derivativesV i andμ i are set to zero. Clearly, the equilibrium (V * , µ * , Λ * ) of the economy without penalization (ε = 0) is a steady state of the economy with penalization (ε > 0).
Approximating the Search Intensity Allocation
Simple computations show that the unique solution of (91) is of a smooth function L( · ), with Λ = L(W ). Hence, the dynamics of the state are described by the systemḋ
w t = R(d t , µ t , w t , L(w t )).
The dynamic of the dividend rate (98) is assumed to be autonomous and linear for convenience. Equation (99) represents the ODE (83)- (84) for the distribution of types, and equation (100) follows from simple manipulation of the system (87)- (90) of penalized Bellman equations.
Linearized Dynamics
We first check the local uniqueness of the perfect-foresight dynamics by linearizing the system (98)-(100) in a neighborhood of its steady-state. The linearized dynamics are
where J f y denotes the Jacobian of some function f : R M → R N . In order to check the local determinacy of the perfect-foresight equilibrium, we use the eigenvalue decomposition that is standard in linear rational expectations models. (see Buiter [1984] for the continuous-time version.) In all of our numerical examples, we find that J has as many eigenvalues with positive real part as non-predetermined variables, ensuring local determinacy.
The linearization also provides an approximation of the perfect-foresight equilibrium path. We instead propose computations based on a reverse-shooting method. As the figures make clear, reverse shooting with a barrier function provides a smooth approximation of a "bang-bang" policy function. A linearization, on the other hand, could not capture this "bang-bang" feature.
Computing Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
We follow the reverse-shooting method described in Judd [1999] . The perfectforesight equilibrium path solves the system (98)-(100) of ordinary differential equations , denotedẏ = g(y). We let y * be the steady-state and y 0 = d 0 µ 0 w 0 be the initial condition. We fix a time horizon T . Given a candidate terminal value y T , we solve the ODEẏ = g(y) backward, using a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method. This computation delivers candidate-initial conditionsd 0 (y T ),μ 0 (y T ), andw 0 (y T ). The reverse-shooting method solves the problem
subject to y T − y * < η, where η is a small positive number. In order to solve the program (102), we use a continuation method. Namely, we solve successive programs along a decreasing path ε 1 > ε 2 · · · > ε N = ε. The n-th version of the optimization program (102) is used as the initial condition of the n + 1-st program.
For the study of an unexpected permanent increase of the dividend rate, we set ε = 0.001. For the study of a temporary increase, we set ε = 0.003.
